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Abstract—In this paper, we first analyze the adverse effects
of cyber-physical attacks on the event-triggered distributed
Kalman filter (DKF). More specifically, we show that attacks
can adversely and significantly affect the state estimation error
covariance of the sensors, and, consequently, the performance
of the DKF. We also show that the event-triggered mechanism
in the DKF can be leveraged by the attacker to cause a non-
triggering misbehavior that significantly harms the network
connectivity and its collective observability. Moreover, an attacker
can also mislead the event-triggered mechanism and achieves a
continuous-triggering misbehavior to drain the communication
resources. An information-theoretic approach is then presented
to detect attacks on both sensors and communication channels.
To mitigate attacks, a meta-Bayesian approach is presented that
incorporates the outcome of the attack detection mechanism to
perform second-order inference and consequently form trust over
estimates. That is, the second-order inference for each sensor
forms internal and external beliefs about the truthfulness or
legitimacy of the outcome of its own first-order inference (i.e.,
the posterior belief about the state estimate) and those of its
neighbors, respectively. Each sensor communicates its internal
belief to its neighbors. Sensors then incorporate the internal be-
liefs of their neighbors and their own external beliefs about their
neighbors into their posterior update laws to successfully discard
corrupted information. Finally, the simulation result validates the
effectiveness of the presented resilient event-triggered DKF.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system, Cyber-attack, Perfor-
mance analysis, resilient estimation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) refer to a class of engineer-
ing systems that integrate the cyber aspects of computation
and communication with physical entities [1]. Integrating
communication and computation with sensing and control
elements has made CPSs a key enabler in designing emerging
autonomous and smart systems with the promise of bringing
unprecedented benefits to humanity. CPSs have already had a
profound impact on variety of engineering sectors, including,
process industries [2], robotics [3], smart grids [4], and intelli-
gent transportation [5], to name a few. Despite their advantages
with vast growth and success, these systems are vulnerable
to cyber-physical threats, and can face fatal consequences if
not empowered with resiliency. The importance of designing
resilient and secure CPSs can be witnessed from the severe
damages made by recently reported cyber-physical attacks
such as the Stuxnet malware [6] and the Maroochy water
bleach [7].
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are a class of CPSs for
which a set of sensors is spatially distributed to monitor and
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estimate a variable of interest (e.g., location of a moving target,
state of a large-scale system, etc.), and has various applications
such as surveillance and monitoring, target tracking, and active
health monitoring [8]. In centralized WSNs, all sensors broad-
cast their measurements to a center at which the information
is fused to estimate the state [9]. These approaches, however,
are communication demanding and prone to single-point-of-
failure. To estimate the state with reduced communication
burden, a distributed Kalman filter (DKF) is presented in [10]-
[12], in which sensors exchange their information only with
their neighbors, not with all agents in the network or a central
agent. Since nodes in a WSN are usually low-cost sensors,
powered through batteries with limited energy, it becomes vital
for DKFs to minimize the data transmission between neighbors
as much as possible while minimizing the compromise on
the network performance. To this end, several energy efficient
event-triggered distributed state estimation approaches are pre-
sented that intermittently exchange information among sensor
nodes, instead of continual exchange of information [13]-[16].
Although event-triggered distributed state estimation pro-
vides resource efficiency, it provides an opportunity for an
attacker to harm the network performance and its connectiv-
ity by corrupting the information that is exchanged among
sensors, as well as to misleading the event-triggered mech-
anism. In recent years, secure estimation and secure control
of CPSs have received significant attention and remarkable
results have been reported for mitigation of cyber-physical
attacks, including denial of service attacks [17]-[18], false
data injection attacks [19]-[25], and bias injection attacks [26]-
[27]. For the time-triggered distributed scenario, secure state
estimation approaches are presented in [28]-[32], which are
limited to either mitigating a particular class of attacks or only
analysis and detection of attacks. To our knowledge, resilient
state estimation for event-triggered DKF is not considered in
the literature.
In this paper, we first evaluate the effect of cyber-physical
attacks on the event-triggered DKF for the state estimation
over a WSN. More specifically, we show that an attacker
can adversely increase the state estimation error covariance,
drain the WSN resources, and damage its performance and
connectivity. More importantly, we show that although event-
triggered mechanisms are highly desirable, if not empowered
with resiliency, the attacker can take advantage of it and
cause emerging a non-triggering misbehavior, in the sense
that the compromised sensor nodes do not broadcast any
information to their neighbors. This can significantly harm the
network connectivity and its collective observability, which is a
necessary condition for solving the distributed state estimation
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problem. Thus, the non-triggering misbehavior can even make
it impossible for the WSN to estimate the desired target state.
To make the same level of damage in a time-triggered DKF,
much more sophisticated attacks with more resources should
be designed by the attacker. We then consider an information-
theoretic metric in the family of f-divergence functions, i.e.,
the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence approach, to detect
adversarial intrusions in the DKF. A meta-Bayesian approach
is then employed using this KL divergence criterion that
performs second-order inference to form internal and external
beliefs about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the outcome of
its own first-order inference (i.e., the posterior belief about
the state estimate) and those of its neighbors, respectively.
Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its neighbors
to put an appropriate weight on the information they receive
from it, depending on its level of trustworthiness. Sensors also
incorporate the external beliefs about their neighbors into their
posterior update laws to put less weight on untrusted data and
thus successfully discard corrupted information. This is shown
to guarantee a resilient DKF for state estimation over a WSN.
Finally, the effectiveness of the presented approach is validated
through simulations.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
The data communication among sensors in the WSN is
captured by an undirected graph G , consists of a pair (V ,E ),
where V = {1,2, . . . ,N} is the set of nodes or sensors and
E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges. An edge from node j to
node i, represented by ( j, i), implies that node j can broadcast
information to node i. Moreover, Ni = { j : ( j, i)∈ E } is the set
of neighbors of node i on the graph G . An induced subgraph
G
′
is obtained by removing a set of nodes W ⊂ V from the
original graph G , which is represented by nodes set V \W and
contains the edges of E with both endpoints in V \W .
Throughout this paper, R and N represent the sets of real
numbers and natural numbers, respectively. Rn denotes the
n-dimensional Euclidean space. The superscript (.)T denotes
transposition. col(A) stands for the column vector of the matrix
A. Similarly, λmax(A) represents maximum eigenvalue of the
matrix A. Consider pX (x) as the probability distribution of the
random variable or vector x with X taking values in a finite
set. If X ∼N (υ ,σ2), i.e., it is a Gaussian distribution, then
pX (x) = (1/
√
2piσ2)e(−
(x−ν)
2σ2
)
with mean ν and covariance σ2. E[X ] and ΣX = E[XXT ]
denotes, respectively, the expectation and the covariance of
the random variable X . Finally, E[.|.] represents the conditional
expectation.
B. Process Dynamics and Sensor Models
Consider a process that evolves according to the following
dynamics
x(k+1) = Ax(k) + w(k) (1)
where A denotes the process dynamic matrix, and x(k) ∈ Rn
and w(k) are, respectively, the process state and process noise
at time k. The process noise w(k) is assumed to be independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with Gaussian distribution,
and x0 ∈N (xˆ0|−1,P0|−1) represents the initial process state.
The goal is to estimate the state x(k) for the process in (1) in
a distributed fashion using N sensor nodes that communicate
through the graph G , and their sensing models are given by
yi(k) =Cixi(k) + vi(k); ∀i = 1, · · · ,N (2)
where yi(k) ∈ Rp represents the measurement data with vi(k)
as the i.i.d. Gaussian measurement noise and Ci as the obser-
vation matrix of the sensor i at time k, respectively.
Assumption 1. The process noise w(k), the measurement noise
vi(k) and the initial state x0 are uncorrelated random vector
sequences.
Assumption 2. The sequences w(k) and vi(k) are zero-mean
white Gaussian noise processes with
E[w(k)w(h)T ] = µkhQ (Q≥ 0)
and
E[vi(k)(vi(h))T ] = µkhRi (Ri  0)
with µkh = 0 if k 6= h, and µkh = 1 otherwise.
Assumption 3. The sensor network is not locally observable
through each pair (A,Ci) for any i ∈ V , but is collectively
observable through the pair (A,C) with C =Col(C1, . . . ,CN).
Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard assumptions in Kalman
filters. Assumption 3 ([10],[33]) states that the state of the
target in (1) cannot be observed by measurements of any
single sensor, i.e., the pairs (A,Ci) are not observable. It also
provides the necessary assumption of collective observability
for the estimation problem to be solvable. This necessitates
the exchange of communication among sensors.
Definition 1 (Intact sensor node). Sensor nodes that are not
directly under attack are called intact sensor nodes.
Definition 2 (Compromised sensor node). Sensor nodes that
are directly under attack are called compromised sensor nodes.
C. Event-triggered Distributed Kalman Filter
This subsection presents the standard event-triggered DKF
for estimating the process state x(k) in (1) from a collection
of noisy measurements yi(k) in (2).
Let the prior and posterior estimates of the target state
x(k) for sensor node i at time k be denoted by xi(k|k− 1)
and xi(k|k), respectively. In the centralized Kalman filter,
a recursive rule based on Bayesian inference is employed
to compute the posterior estimate xi(k|k) based on its prior
estimate xi(k|k− 1) and the new measurement yi(k). When
the next measurement comes, the previous posterior estimate
is used as a new prior and it proceed with the same recursive
estimation rule. In the event-triggered DKF, the recursion rule
for computing the posterior incorporates not also its own
prior and observations, but also its neighbors predictive state
estimate. The sensor j communicates its prior state estimate
to its neighbors if its innovation based on last transmitted
prior becomes greater than a threshold after a new observation
arrives. That is, it employs the following event-triggering
mechanism for exchange of data with its neighbors
E
∥∥(y j(k)−C j x¯trj )∥∥2 ≤ α (3)
where α denotes the predefined threshold for triggering and
x¯trj denotes the last transmitted prior to the neighbors from any
sensor j.
Using this event-triggering mechanism, the following recur-
sion rule can be presented for the event-triggered DKF [15]
for the sensor i as
xi(k|k) = xi(k|k−1)+Ki(k)(yi(k)−Cixi(k|k−1))
+ γi ∑
j∈Ni
(x˜ j(k)− x˜i(k)) (4)
where
xi(k+1|k) = Axi(k|k) (5)
is the prior update, and the second and the third terms in (4)
denote, respectively, the innovation part (i.e., the estimation
error based on the sensor ith new observation and its prior
prediction) and the consensus part (i.e., deviation of the sensor
state estimates from its neighbors state estimates). We call
this recursion rule as Bayesian first-order inference on the
posterior, which provides our belief on the value of the state.
Moreover, Ki(k) and γi in (4), respectively, denote the
Kalman gain and the coupling coefficient, and x˜ j(k) in (4)
is the predictive state estimate that is received by sensor j at
time k, and can be modeled as
x˜ j(k) = ζi(k)xi(k|k−1)+(1−ζ j(k))Ax˜ j(k−1)
∀ j ∈J = Ni∪{i} (6)
with ζ j(k) ∈ {0,1} as the transmit function and is one if the
sensor j transmits its new estimate to its neighbors at time k
(i.e., whenever the event-triggered condition in (3) is violated),
and is zero if the sensor i does not receive information from
sensor j at time k and uses its old exchanged information.
The Kalman filter gain Ki(k) in (4) depends on the es-
timation error covariance matrices associated with the prior
xi(k|k−1) and the posterior xi(k|k) for sensor i, defined as
Pi(k|k−1) = E[(x(k)− xi(k|k−1))(x(k)− xi(k|k−1))T ],
Pi(k|k) = E[(x(k)− xi(k|k))(x(k)− xi(k|k))T ] (7)
The posterior state estimation error covariance Pi(k|k) and the
prior state estimation error covariance Pi(k|k− 1) in (7) are
given by [15]
Pi(k|k) = (I−Ki(k)Ci)Pi(k|k−1)(I−Ki(k)Ci)T
+Ki(k)Ri(Ki(k))
T (8)
and
Pi(k+1|k) = APi(k|k)AT +Q (9)
Then, the Kalman gain Ki(k) is designed using error covari-
ance Pi(k|k−1) and noise covariance Rik as [15]
Ki(k) = Pi(k|k−1)(Ci)T (Ri(k)+CiPi(k|k−1)(Ci)T )−1 (10)
Let the innovation sequence ri(k) for the node i be defined
as
ri(k) = yi(k)−Cixi(k|k−1) (11)
where ri(k) is a zero-mean white Gaussian process with
covariance Ωi(k) as [15]
Ωi(k) = E[ri(k)(ri(k))T ] =CiPi(k|k−1)CiT +Ri(k) (12)
Note that for the notional simplicity, henceforth we keep the
sensor index i but ignore the time-indexing k from notations.
We therefore denote the prior and posterior state estimations
as xi(k|k− 1) , x¯i and xi(k|k) , xˆi, respectively. Without the
time index, we represent the prior at time k+1 as xi(k+1|k),
x¯+i . Also, the prior covariance and the posterior covariance
are, respectively, denoted by Pi(k|k−1), P¯i and Pi(k|k), Pˆi.
The event-triggered DKF algorithm ignoring the time index
reduces to [15]
Measurment updates
xˆi = x¯i+Ki(yi−Cix¯i)+ γi ∑
j∈Ni
(x˜ j− x˜i) (a)
x˜+j = ζ j(x¯ j)
++(1−ζ j)Ax˜ j (b)
Ki = P¯iCT (Ri+CiP¯iCTi )
−1
(c)
Pˆi = (I−KiCi)P¯i(I−KiCi)T +KiRi(Ki)T (d)
(13)
Time updates{
x¯+i = Axˆi (a)
P¯+i = APˆiA
T +Q (b)
(14)
The following theorem shows that the event-driven DKF
given in (14)-(15) with the triggering condition (3) collectively
minimizes the global performance function
Ψ(k) =∑
i
E‖x− xˆi‖2 (15)
using only the intermittent exchange of local information
among the sensors.
Theorem 1. Consider the event triggered DKF (13)-(14) with
the triggering mechanism (3) the consensus coefficient satisfies
γi >
2(I−KiCi)(Γi)−1
λmax(L )λmax((Γ)−1)
(16)
where L denotes the Laplacian matrix associated with the
graph G and Γ= diag{Γ1, ..,ΓN} with
Γi = (I−KiCi)T AT (P¯i)+A(I−KiCi) ∀i = {1, ...,N}.
Then, in the absence of noise, the consensus filter error
dynamics in (4) is globally asymptotically stable. Moreover,
the expected value of all estimators reach consensus on the
expected value of the state of the process, i.e., E[xi(k|k)]→
E[x(k)] ∀ i = 1, · · · ,N as k→ ∞.
Proof. The result follows directly from Theorem 2 in [15] with
relaxation on the coupling coefficient condition in (16)
Remark 1. Note that the design of event-triggered DKF is
not the concern of this paper. We consider the event-triggered
DKF presented in [15], which based on Theorem 1 guarantees
the consensus on the state estimates of the process state in the
absence of attacks. We then analyze the effect of attacks on
the triggering mechanism and propose a mitigation approach.
The presented attack analysis and mitigation can be readily
extended to other event-triggered methods as well [13]-[16].
D. Attack Modeling
In this subsection, we model the effects of attacks on the
event-triggered DKF. An attacker can design a false data
injection attack and affect the triggering mechanism presented
in (3) to compromise the system behavior. The goal of the
attacker here is to maximize the state estimation error covari-
ance by deceiving the triggering mechanism and consequently
to degrade the performance of the system.
Consider the sensing model (2) for the sensor node under
the effect of the attack as
yai = yi+ fi =Cixi + vi+ fi (17)
where yi and yai are, respectively, the sensor i
′s actual and
corrupted measurements at time k, and fi ∈ Rp represents
the adversarial input on sensor i at time k (the time index
k is removed from (17) for notational simplicity). For a
compromised sensor node i, let p′ ⊆ p be the subset of
measurements disrupted by the attacker. The adversarial input
fi is unknown to the system and its effects can only be seen
through the sensor readings.
Under attack on the sensor node i and/or its neighbors, the
posterior estimate in the event-triggered DKF (4) for the sensor
node i becomes
xˆai = x¯
a
i +K
a
i (y
a
i −Cix¯ai )+ γai ∑
j∈Ni
(x˜aj − x˜ai ) (18)
where x¯ai and xˆ
a
i denote, respectively, the prior and posterior
state estimates under attacks.
Using (18), under attacks, the state estimate equations can
be simplified as{
xˆai = x¯
a
i +K
a
i (yi−Cix¯ai )+ γai ∑
j∈Ni
(x˜ j− x˜ai )+ f ai
(x¯ai )
+ = Axˆai
(19)
where
f ai = K
a
i fi+ γ
a
i ∑
j∈Ni
f¯ j ∼N (µ if a ,Σif a) (20)
with µ if a and Σ
i
f a , respectively, the mean and the covariance of
f ai . Moreover, the first part in (20) represents the direct attack
on sensor node i and second part denotes the aggregative effect
of adversarial input on neighboring sensor j ∈ Ni.
III. EFFECT OF ATTACK ON TRIGGERING MECHANISM
This section presents the effects of cyber-physical attacks
on the event-triggered DKF and shows that an attacker can
manipulate the sensor measurement to mislead the event-
triggered condition and damage the system performance either
by continuous-triggering the data transition mechanism or by
causing a non-triggering misbehavior that harms the network
connectivity.
A. Non-triggering Misbehavior
In this subsection, we show how an attacker can manipulate
the sensor measurement to mislead the event-triggered mecha-
nism and damage the connectivity and collective observability
by causing a non-triggering misbehavior as defined in the
following Definition 3.
Definition 3 (Non-triggering Misbehavior). The attacker
designs an attack strategy such that a compromised sensor
node does not transmit any information to its neighbors by
misleading the triggering mechanism in (3), even if the actual
performance deviates from the desired one.
To mislead a sensor to show a non-triggering misbehavior,
an attacker can manipulate the sensor reading by designing
a replay attack. For example, an attacker can eavesdrop the
transmitted state estimate at the triggering time instant, i.e.,
x¯itr in (3). Then, using the eavesdropped state estimate, at
each time instant, the attacker can replace the actual sensor
measurement yi with the corrupted sensor measurement given
by
yai =Cix¯
tr
i + γi (21)
where γi denotes zero-mean Gaussian noise. The follow-
ing theorem shows that this attack strategy results in non-
triggering misbehavior which can cluster the graph under some
conditions and thus significantly harm its connectivity. To this
end, we first define the vertex cut of the graph as follows.
Definition 4 (Vertex cut). A set of nodes C ⊂ V is a vertex
cut of a graph G if removing the nodes in the set C results
in a disconnected graph clusters.
Lemma 1. Let a set of sensor nodes An ⊂ V be the vertex
cut of the graph G and all its sensors be under the replay
attack given by (21). Then, the original graph G clusters into
subgraphs.
Proof. For a sensor node i in the set An, based on the
corrupted sensor measurement in (21), the event-triggered
condition in (3) becomes
E
∥∥(yai −Cix¯tri )∥∥2 = E∥∥(Cix¯tri + γi−Cix¯tri )∥∥2 = E‖(γi)‖2 < α
(22)
Then, according to (22), the corrupted sensor node i always
satisfies the event-triggered condition in (3) and thus does not
transmit its state estimate to its neighbors. Therefore, since
this is true for all states in An, they all show non-triggering
misbehavior. Therefore, they do not transmit any information
to their neighbors, they act as sink nodes. Since the set of
sensor nodesAn is a vertex cut, the non-triggering misbehavior
of sensor nodes in An prevents information flow from one
portion of the graph G to another portion of the graph G
and thus clusters the original graph G into subgraphs. This
completes the proof.
We provide Example 1 for further illustration of the results
of Lemma 1.
Example 1. Consider a graph topology for distributed sensor
network given in figure 1. Let the vertex cut An = {5,6}
be under the presented replay attack in (21) and shows non-
triggering misbehavior. Then, the sensor nodes in An = {5,6}
do not transmit any information to their neighbors under
the designed replay attack. Moreover, the sensor nodes in
An = {5,6} act as sinks and prevent information flow from
subgraph G 1 to subgraph G 2 which clusters the graph G into
two non-interacting subgraphs G 1 and G 2 as shown in figure
1. This example shows that the attacker can compromise the
vertex cut An of the original graph G such that it shows non-
triggering misbehavior and harm the network connectivity or
cluster the graph into various non-interacting subgraphs.
Fig. 1: Effect of non-triggering misbehavior on sensor nodes (5,6) cluster the graph G
in two isolated graph G1 and G2.
We now analyze the effect of non-triggering misbehavior
on the collective observability of the sensor network. The
following definitions are needed.
Definition 5 (Potential Set). A set of nodes P ⊂ V is said
to be a potential set of a graph G if the pair (A,CV \P) is not
collectively observable.
Definition 6 (Minimal Potential Set). A set of nodesPm⊂V
is said to be a minimal potential set if Pm is a potential set
and no subset of Pm is a potential set.
Remark 2. Note that an attacker knows the graph structure
and the local pair (A,Ci) ∀i ∈ V . Therefore, an attacker can
identify the minimum potential set of sensor nodes Pm in
the graph G and achieves non-triggering misbehavior for Pm.
Then, the set of sensor nodes Pm does not exchange any
information with its neighbors and becomes isolated in the
graph G . To achieve same isolation for the minimum potential
set of sensor nodes Pm much more sophisticated attacks
needs to be designed for each sensor nodes in time-triggered
framework.
Theorem 2. Let the set of sensors that shows non-triggering
misbehavior be a minimum potential setAm. Then, the network
is no longer collectively observable and the process state
reconstruction from the distributed sensor measurements is
impossible.
Proof. To ensure collective observability, based on Assump-
tion 3, the pair (A,CG ) needs to be observable. According to
the statement of the theorem, Am represents a potential set of
the graph G and from the definition of non-triggering misbe-
havior, the nodes in the set Am do not transmit any information
to their neighbors and they act as sink nodes, i.e., they only
absorb information. Therefore, the exchange of information
among sensor nodes happen between the remaining graph
G /Am only. Hence, one can conclude that after excluding the
minimum potential nodes Am, based on the Definition 5 and 6
the pair (A,CG /Am) becomes unobservable, and thus makes the
state reconstruction impossible. This completes the proof.
Remark 3. Note that to achieve the same level of damage
as the non-triggering misbehavior can make, much more
sophisticated attacks need to be designed for time-triggered
DKFs. For instance, in Example 1 the attacker can cluster the
complete graph into two subgraphs just by deceiving event-
triggered condition for the set An = {5,6}. On the other hand
for the time-driven DKFs, to achieve this, the attacker needs
to jam all the communication links from the set An = {5,6}
to other sensor nodes or completely hijack the sensor nodes,
which is practically hard to achieve at each time instant. This
analysis shows that although event-triggered approaches are
energy efficient, they are prone to non-triggering misbehavior,
which can harm the network connectivity and observability
drastically.
B. Continuous-triggering Misbehavior
In this subsection, we discuss how an attacker can com-
promise the actual sensor measurement to mislead the event-
triggered mechanism and achieves continuous-triggering mis-
behavior and thus results in a time-driven DKF that not only
drains the communication resources but also continuously
propagate the adverse effect of attacks.
Definition 7 (Continuous-triggering Misbehavior). The at-
tacker deceives the triggering mechanism in (3) and turns the
event-driven DKF into a time-driven DKF that continuously
exchanges corrupted information among sensor nodes.
Theorem 3. Let the sensor node i in (2) be under attack fi. If
the magnitude of fi changes sufficiently fast, then sensor node
i shows the continuous-triggering misbehavior.
Proof. To mislead a sensor to cause a continuous-triggering
misbehavior, the attack signal fi in (17) can be designed such
that the event-triggered condition (3) keeps being violated, i.e.,
E
∥∥∥(yai −C j x¯ jtr)∥∥∥2 >α all the time, which means the estimation
error of sensor i becomes greater than the threshold α all the
time. Based on the corrupted sensor measurement in (17), one
can write the event-triggered condition in (3) as
E
∥∥(yai −Cix¯tri )∥∥2 = E∥∥(Cixi + vi+ fi−Cix¯tri )∥∥2 (23)
If an attacker injects a constant signal fi > α , then the
estimated measurement Cix¯tri converges to the corrupted sensor
measurement yai =Cixi+ fi after some time steps and thus (21)
becomes close to zero again and consequently the attacker
cannot ensure continuous violation of the event-triggered
condition (3). However, if the attacker changes the magnitude
of its attack signal after every few iterations or sufficiently
fast before the state estimate converges to the previous cor-
rupted measurement, then the state estimate cannot follow
the corrupted sensor measurement due to its variation and
thus (21) can be always violated, which guarantees continuous
violation of the event-triggered condition (3). This completes
the proof.
A broad range of attack signals can be designed such that
their variation is faster than the state estimate convergence
which ensures the continuous violation of the event-triggered
condition (3). For example, high-frequency sinusoidal signals
or square signals or to name a few. This is also verified in the
simulation results.
Note that continuous-triggering misbehavior can completely
ruin the advantage of event-triggered mechanisms and turn
into time-driven mechanisms which significant increases the
communication burden. Since nodes in the WSNs are usually
powered through batteries with limited energy, the attacker
can drain sensors limited resources by designing the above-
discussed attack signals to achieve the continuous-triggering
misbehavior, and, consequently can make them non-operating
in the network along with the deteriorated performance of the
network.
Remark 4. In the existing literature, similar event-triggered
conditions are presented for DKFs [13]-[14] as well as cen-
tralized Kalman filters for the remote estimation problem [17].
Based on the above analysis an attacker can achieve the non-
triggering misbehavior for the mentioned existing approaches
and harm the network connectivity or the global performance
of the system.
Note that although we classified attacks into non-triggering
misbehavior and continuous-triggering misbehavior, to analyze
how the attacker can leverage the event-triggering mechanism,
the following analysis, detection and mitigation approaches
are not restricted to any class of attacks.
IV. EFFECT OF ATTACK ON PERFORMANCE
This section presents the recursion of the state estimation
error covariance under the effect of the adversarial input and
shows how an attacker can significantly deteriorate the system
performance.
In the following theorem, we show that the posterior state
estimation error covariance Pai under the attacks becomes
Pai = MiP¯
a
i M
T
i +K
a
i Ri(K
a
i )
T +2γai (∑
j∈Ni
_
P
a
i, j−
_
P
a
i )M
T
i
+(γai )
2 ∑
j∈Ni
(P˜aj −2P˜ai, j + P˜ai )+Σif a (24)
where P¯ai , P˜
a
i, j and
_
P
a
i, j are the prior and cross-correlated esti-
mation error covariances, which will be shown to be updated
according to (30)-(32), Σif a is the covariance matrix of the
attack signal defined in (20), Mi = (I−Kai Ci), and Kai is the
Kalman gain under the effect of attacks and is given by
Kai = P¯
a
i Ci
T (Ri+CiP¯ai Ci
T )
−1
(25)
Note that according to Theorem 1, in the absence of the
attack, the expected estimated states converge to the expected
target state and the state estimation error covariance remains
bounded as given by (8). However, equation (24) illustrates
that in the presence of the attack, the state estimation error
covariance recursion evolution depends on the attackers input.
More specifically, the corrupted state estimate covariance Pai
in (24) depends on its prior P¯ai , which is a function of x¯
a
i
given in (19). On the other hand, the deviation between x¯ai
and the actual process state depends on the attackers input f ai .
Thus, an attacker can inject the attack signal to increase the
state estimation covariance and makes it unbounded or keep it
bounded with a large bound value with a limited energy attack
signal.
In the following theorem, we show that how the perfor-
mance of event-triggered DKF deteriorates in the presence of
the attacks.
Theorem 4. Consider the process dynamics (1) with compro-
mised sensor model (17). Let the state estimation equation be
given by (19) in the presence of attacks modeled by f ai in (20).
Assume that attacker’s distribution is i.i.d. Then, the posterior
state estimation error covariance Pai under attacks is given by
(24).
Proof. Using the process dynamics in (1) and the prior state
estimate in (5), one can write the prior state estimation error
under attacks as
(η¯ai )
+ = x+− (x¯ai )+ = A(x − xˆai ) + w (26)
where the compromised posterior state estimate xˆai follows (19)
and the time-index free notations x+ and x denote, respectively,
the process states at time k+1 and k from (1). Similarly, using
(19), the posterior state estimation error becomes
ηai = x− xˆai = x− x¯ai −Kai (yi−Cx¯ai )− γai ∑
j∈Ni
(x˜ j− x˜ai )− f ai
(27)
Then, one can write (26)-(27) as{
(η¯ai )
+ = Aηai + w
ηai = (I−Kai Ci)η¯ai −Kai vi+uai
(28)
where uai = γai ∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai )− f ai .
Now, using (6) we define the predictive state estimation
error under attack as
(η˜ai )
+ = x+− (x˜ai )+ = ζ+i (η¯ai )++(1−ζ+i )Aη˜ai (29)
Based on (28), the covariance of the prior estimation error
under attacks becomes
(P¯ai )
+
= E
[
(η¯ai )
+((η¯ai )
+)
T
]
= E
[
(Aηai + w)(Aη
a
i + w)
T
]
= APai A
T +Q (30)
Using the corrupted predictive state estimate error (η˜ai )
+ in
(29) with (P¯ai, j)
+
= APai, jA
T + Q, one can write the cross-
correlated predictive state estimation error covariance (P˜ai, j)
+
as
(P˜ai, j)
+
= E
[
(η˜ai )
+((η˜aj )
+)
T
]
= E[(ζ+i (η¯
a
i )
++(1−ζ+i )(Aη˜ai +w))(ζ+j (η¯aj )+
+(1−ζ+j )(Aη˜aj +w))T ]
= ζ+i ζ
+
j (P¯
a
i, j)
+
+ζ+i (1−ζ+j )A(
^
P
a
i, j)
+
+(1−ζ+i )ζ+j (
_
P
a
i, j)
+
AT
+(1−ζ+i )(1−ζ+j )(AP˜ai, jAT +Q) (31)
where
_
P
a
i, j and
^
P
a
i, j be the cross-correlated estimation error
covariances updated according to (32)-(33). Moreover, the
transmit functions ζ+i and ζ
+
i follow the event-triggered
mechanism in (3) under corrupted state estimates.
Note that the graph topology is assumed undirected and the
sensor node j is a direct neighbor of the compromised sensor
node i. However, all sensor nodes are reachable from the
compromised sensor node in the network and all sensors, not
just its immediate neighbor j, are affected by the compromised
sensor node i. The cross-correlated state estimation error
covariance (
_
P
a
i, j)
+
in (31) is given by
(
_
P
a
i, j)
+
= E
[
(η˜ai )
+((η¯aj )
+)
T
]
= E
[
(x+− (x˜ai )+)(x+− (x¯aj)+)T
]
= E
[
(ζ+i (η¯
a
i )
++(1−ζ+i )(Aη˜ai +w))((η¯aj )+ )
T
]
= ζ+i (P¯
a
i, j)
+
+(1−ζ+i )A ∑
r∈Ni
(P˜ai,r− P˜ai, j)(γai A)T+
(1−ζ+i )[A
_
P
a
i, jM
a
i A
T +Q (32)
where P˜ai, j and
^
P
a
i, j denote the cross-correlated estimation error
covariances, evolving according to (31) and (33), respectively.
Similarly, (
^
P
a
i, j)
+
is updated based on the expression given by
(
^
P
a
i, j)
+
= E
[
(η¯ai )
+((η˜aj )
+)
T
]
= E
[
(x+− (x¯aj)+)(x+− (x˜aj)+)T
]
= E
[
(η¯ai )
+(ζ+j (η¯
a
j )
++(1−ζ+j )(Aη˜aj +w))
T
]
= ζ+j (P¯
a
i, j)
+
+(1−ζ+j )[A(Mai )T
_
P
a
i, jA
T +Q]
+ (1−ζ+j )Aγai ∑
s∈Ni
(P˜as, j− P˜ai, j)AT (33)
Now using (27)-(29), one can write the covariance of the
posterior estimation error Pai as
Pai = E
[
ηai (η
a
i )
T
]
= E
[
(Miη¯ai −Kai vi+uai )(Miη¯ai −Kai vi+uai )T
]
(34)
which after further simplification becomes
Pai = E[Miη¯ai (Miη¯ai )
T ]+E[Kai vi(Kai vi)
T ]
−2E[(Miη¯ai )(Kai vi)T ]−2E[Kai vi(γiuai )T ]
+E[(γiuai )(γiuai )
T ]+2E[(Miη¯ai )(γiuai )
T ] (35)
Using (30) and the measurement noise covariance, the first
two terms of (35) become
E[Miη¯ai (Miη¯ai )
T ] = MiP¯ai M
T
i
E[Kai vi(Kai vi)
T ] = Kai Ri(K
a
i )
T (36)
According to Assumption 1, the measurement noise vi is i.i.d.
and uncorrelated with state estimation errors, and, therefore,
the third and fourth terms in (35) become zero. Now uai in (28)
and Assumption 1, the last two terms in (35) can be simplified
as
E[(uai )(uai )
T ] = (γai )
2E([∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai )− f ai ][∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai )− f ai ]T )
= (γai )
2E
[
[∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai )][∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai ))]T
]
+E
[
f ai ( f
a
i )
T
]
= (γai )
2 ∑
j∈Ni
(P˜aj −2P˜ai, j + P˜ai )+Σif a (37)
and
2E[(uai )(Miη¯ai )
T ] = 2E[(γai ∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj − η˜ai )− f ai )(Miη¯ai )T ]
= 2γai E[∑
j∈Ni
(η˜aj η¯
a
i )
T
]MTi −2γai E[η˜ai (η¯ai )T ]MTi −2E[ f ai (η¯ai )T ]MTi
= 2γai ∑
j∈Ni
_
P
a
i, jM
T
i −2γai
_
P
a
i M
T
i (38)
where the cross-correlated term
_
P
a
i, j is updated according to
(32). Since the attackers distribution is i.i.d., its correlation
with state estimation error is zero. Using (35)-(38), the pos-
terior state estimation error Pai under attacks is given by (24).
This completes the proof.
V. ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we present a Kullback-Liebler (KL)-based
attack detection approach for the event-triggered DKF.
The KL divergence is a non-negative measure of the relative
entropy between two probability distributions [35]-[36] which
is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (KL Divergence) [35]-[36]. Let X and Z be
two random sequences with probability distribution PX and
PZ , respectively. The KL divergence measure between PX and
PZ is defined as
DKL(X ||Z) =∑
θ
PX (θ) log
(
PX (θ)
PZ(θ)
)
(39)
with the following properties [35]:
1) DKL(PX ||Pz)≥ 0
2) DKL(PX ||Pz) = 0 if and only if, PX = Pz
3) DKL(PX ||Pz) 6= DKL(Pz||PX )
The innovation sequences represent the deviation of the
actual output of the system from the estimated one. It is known
that innovation sequences approach a steady state quickly
and thus it is reasonable to design innovation-based anomaly
detectors to capture abnormality [37].
Using the innovation sequence of each sensor and the
innovation sequences that it estimates for its neighbors, we
present KL divergence based detectors to capture the effect
of the attacks on the event-triggered DKF. To detect the
effect of attacks on sensors, we determine the relative entropy
between the compromised and nominal innovation sequences
of the sensor using the KL divergence measure and propose a
detector based on it.
Based on innovation expression (11), in the presence of
attack, one can write the compromised innovation rai for sensor
node i with the disrupted measurement yai in (17) and the state
estimation x¯ai in (19) as
rai = y
a
i −Cix¯ai ∼N (µ fi ,Ωi+Σ fi ) (40)
where µ fi and Ωi + Σ
f
i denote, respectively, the mean and
covariance of rai . The nominal innovation ri is defined in
(11). Since in the absence of attack, based on Theorem 1, the
expected value of ri converges to zero, the statistical properties
of this nominal innovation can be given by ri ∼ N (0,Ωi),
where Ωi is its variance and depends on the known variance
of noise.
Using (39), the KL divergence DKL(rai ||ri) for the Gaussian
distribution sequences rai and ri in (40) and (11) can be written
as [32]
DKL(rai ||ri) =
1
2
(log
|Ωi|∣∣∣Ωi+Σ fi ∣∣∣ + tr((Ωi)−1Ωi+Σ fi )− p
+ (µ f¯i )
T
(Ωi+Σ fi )
−1
(µ f¯i )) (41)
where p denotes the dimension of the innovation sequence.
Define the average of the KL divergence over a window T as
Φi =
1
T
k+T−1
∑
k
DKL(rai ||ri) (42)
Now, in the following theorem, it is shown that the effect
of attacks on the sensors can be captured using (42).
Theorem 5. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)-(2)
under attack on sensor. Then,
1) in the absence of attack, Φi defined in (42) approaches
zero.
2) in the presence of attack, Φi defined in (42) is greater
than a predefined threshold δi.
Proof. The mean and the covariance of innovations rai and ri
defined in (40) and (11) are the same in the absence of attacks.
Therefore, the KL divergence DKL(rai ||ri) in (41) yields zero
and this makes Φi in (42) zero. This complete the proof of
part 1.
To prove part 2 of the theorem, using statistical properties
of (40) and (11), the KL divergence DKL(rai ||ri) in (41) can
be simplified as
DKL(rai ||ri) =
1
2
(log
1∣∣∣I+(Ωi)−1Σ fi ∣∣∣ + tr(I+(Ωi)−1Σ fi )
+ (µ f¯i )
T
(Ωi+Σ fi )
−1
(µ f¯i ))
(43)
Using (42), one has
Φi =
1
T
k+T−1
∑
k
DKL(rai ||ri)> δi (44)
where T and δi denote the sliding window size and the
predefined design threshold. This completes the proof.
Based on Theorem 5, one can use the following condition
for attack detection. {
Φi < δi : H0
Φi > δi : H1
(45)
where δi denotes the designed threshold for detection, the null
hypotheses H0 represents the intact mode of sensor nodes and
H1 denotes the compromised mode of sensor nodes.
Based on the results presented in Theorem 5, one can
capture attacks on both sensors and communication links for,
but it cannot identify the specific compromised communication
channel. To detect the source of attacks, we present a KL-
based detector to capture the effect of attacks on the specific
communication channel by determining the relative entropy
between the estimated innovation sequences for the neighbors
at particular sensor node and the nominal innovation sequence
of the considered sensor node in Theorem 6.
Define the estimated innovation sequences ζ ai, j for a neigh-
bor j under attacks on communication channel from the sensor
node i side as
ζ ai, j = yi−C j x˜aj ∼N (µ f¯j ,Ω j +Σ f¯j ) (46)
where x˜aj is the corrupted communicated state estimation of
neighbor j at sensor node i at the last triggering instant,
with µ f¯j and Ωi +Σ
f¯
j denote, respectively, the mean and the
covariance of ζ ai, j.
Note that in the presence of attacks on communication
channels, the neighbors actual innovation differs the neighbors
estimated innovation at sensor i. According to Theorem 1,
in the absence of the attack, all the sensor state estimates
converge to the desired process state at the steady state, and,
therefore, the innovation sequences ri and ζ ai, j are the same.
In presence of the attack, however, as shown in Theorem 6,
their behaviors diverge.
Define the average of the KL divergence over a window T
as
Ψi, j =
1
T
k+T−1
∑
k
DKL(ζ ai, j||ri) (47)
In the following theorem, we show that the effect of attacks
on specific communication links can be detected using the KL
divergence between the innovation sequences ζ ai, j and ri.
Theorem 6. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)-
(2) under attack only on communication links. Then, in the
presence of an attack, Ψi, j defined in (47) is greater than a
predefined threshold δi.
Proof. Using the nominal innovation sequence ri ∼N (0,Ωi)
defined in (11) with ζ ai, j ∼N (µ f¯j ,Ω j +Σ f¯j ) in (46), one can
write
DKL(ζ ai, j||ri) =
1
2
log |Ωi|∣∣∣Ω j +Σ f¯j ∣∣∣ − p+ tr((Ωi)−1Ω j +Σ f¯j )

+
1
2
(µ f¯j )
T
(Ωi)−1(µ f¯j ) (48)
Then, using (47), one has
Ψi, j =
1
T
k+T−1
∑
k
DKL(ζ ai, j||ri)> δi (49)
where T and δi denote the sliding window size and the
predefined design threshold. This completes the proof.
Using Theorem 6, one can adopt a similar hypothesis in
(45) to detect attacks on a specific communication link. Using
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we can capture attacks on both
sensor nodes and communication links of the event-triggered
DKF.
Note that the non-triggering misbehavior of a sensor node
can also be detected based on the same detector presented in
Theorem 5 under the presented replay attack in the section III.
For more clarity, however, we formally model the corrupted in-
novation and present the results for detection of non-triggering
misbehavior of a sensor node in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Consider the distributed sensor network (1)-(2)
with sensor nodes showing non-triggering misbehavior. Then,
in the presence of attack, Φi defined in (42) is always greater
than a predefined threshold δi.
Proof. For the non-triggering misbehavior of sensor i, as
shown in Lemma 1, an attacker eavesdrops the last transmitted
state estimate and replaces the actual sensor measurement with
Cix¯itr+γi at each time instant, which results in yai =Cix¯itr+γi ,
where γi is a zero-mean Gaussian noise added by the attacker.
Using the manipulated sensor measurement, one can write the
innovation under non-triggering misbehavior rani as
rani = y
a
i −Cix¯ai =Cix¯itr + γi−Cix¯i ∼N (
_
µ i,
_
Ωi) (50)
where x¯ai deviates from the eavesdropped state estimate x¯
i
tr
due to the consensus error between the sensor node i and
its neighbors (as neighbors state estimates are updated based
on the actual sensor measurement, which causes discrepancy
between the predictive state estimates of sensor node i and its
neighbors in (4)). Moreover,
_
µ i and
_
Ωi denote, respectively,
the mean and covariance of the innovation sequence rani .
Now, using the (41), one can write
DKL(rani ||ri) =
1
2
(log
|Ωi|∣∣∣_Ωi∣∣∣ + tr(Ωi−1
_
Ωi)− p+ _µ i
T
(
_
Ωi)
−1_
µ i
(51)
where ri∼N (0,Ωi) is the nominal innovation defined in (11).
Then using (42), one has
Φi =
1
T
k+T−1
∑
k
DKL(rani ||ri)> δi (52)
where T and δi denote, respectively, the sliding window size
and the predefined design threshold. This completes the proof.
Note that based on the result presented in Theorem 6, one
can detect the non-triggering misbehavior of sensor nodes. In
the following section, we present the design of a resilient state
estimator based on the notion of beliefs.
Remark 5. Not that we are not restricting attackers input to
any particular class of attacks. It can be any type of false
injection attack signal with the objective to degrade the overall
performance defined in (15). The attacker can design a wide
range of attack signals varying from deterministic signals to
any stochastic signals.
VI. SECURE DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION MECHANISM
This section presents a meta-Bayesian approach for the
secure event-triggered DKF, which incorporates the outcome
of the attack detection mechanism to perform second-order
inference and consequently form beliefs over beliefs. That
is, the second-order inference forms internal and external
beliefs about the truthfulness or legitimacy of the sensors’
own state estimate (i.e., the posterior belief of the first-order
Bayesian inference) and those of its neighbor’s state estimates,
respectively. Each sensor communicates its internal belief to its
neighbors. Then sensors incorporate the internal beliefs of their
neighbors and their own external beliefs about their neighbors
into their posterior update laws to successfully discard the
corrupted information.
A. Internal belief of sensor nodes
The second-order inference forms the internal belief of
sensor nodes which determines the level of trustworthiness of
each sensor about its own measurement and state estimate (i.e.,
the posterior belief of the first-order Bayesian inference). If a
sensor node is compromised, then the presented attack detector
detects the adversary and it then reduces its level of trust-
worthiness about its own understanding of the environment
and communicates it with its neighbors to inform them the
significance of its outgoing information and thus slow down
the attack propagation.
To determine the internal belief of a sensor node i, based
on the divergence DKL(rai ||ri) from Theorem 5, we first define
χi(k) =
ϒ1
ϒ1+DKL(rai ||ri)
(53)
with 0 < ϒ1 < 1 represents a predefined threshold to account
for the channel fading and other uncertainties. Then, in the
following lemma, we formally present the results for the
internal belief of a sensor node.
Lemma 2. Let βi(k) be the internal belief of a sensor node i
which is updated using
βi(k) =
k−1
∑
l=0
(κ1)k−lχi(l) (54)
where χi(k) is defined in (53), and κ1 > 0 is a discount factor.
Then, βi(k) ∈ (0,1] and
1) for a compromised sensor node i, βi(k)→ 0.
2) for a intact sensor node i, βi(k) = 1.
Proof. Based on the expression (53), since DKL(rai ||ri) ≥ 0,
one has χi(k) ∈ (0,1] ∀k. Then, using (54), one can infer that
βi(k) ∈ (0,1] ∀k.
Now according to Theorem 5, if the sensor node i is under
attack, then DKL(rai ||ri) >> ϒi in (53), which makes χi(k)
close to zero. Then, based on expression (54) with the discount
factor κ1 > 0, the internal belief βi(k) in (54) approaches zero,
and thus the ith sensor’s belief about the trustworthiness of its
own information would be low. This completes the proof of
part 1.
On the other hand, based on the Theorem 5, in the absence
of attacks, DKL(rai ||ri) tends to zero, which makes χi(k) close
to one and, consequently, βi(k) becomes close to one. This
indicates that the ith sensor node is confident about its own
state estimate. This completes the proof of part 2.
Note that the expression for the internal belief of sensor
node i in (54) can be implemented using following difference
equation
βi(k+1) = βi(k)+∆κ1(χi(k)−βi(k)) (55)
where ∆ denotes the sampling interval.
Note also that the discount factor in (55) determines how
much we value the current experience with regards to past ex-
periences. It also guarantees that if the attack is not persistent
and is gone after a while, or if a short-period adversary rather
than attack (such as packet dropout) causes, the belief will be
recovered, as it mainly depends on the current circumstances.
B. External belief of sensor nodes about their incoming infor-
mation
Similar to the previous subsection, the second-order infer-
ence forms external beliefs of sensor nodes to represent their
level of trust on their neighboring sensor’s state estimates.
External belief decides the usefulness of the neighboring
information in the state estimation of the sensor i.
The external belief of a sensor node i on its neighboring sen-
sor j can be determined based on the divergence DKL(ζ ai, j||ri)
in (46) from Theorem 6, from which we define
θi, j(k) =
Λ1
Λ1+DKL(ζ ai, j||ri)
(56)
where 0<Λ1 < 1 represents a predefined threshold to account
for the channel fading and other uncertainties. Then, in the
following lemma, we formally present the results for the
external belief of a sensor node.
Lemma 3. Let σi, j(k) be the external belief of a sensor node
i on its neighboring sensor j which is updated using
σi, j(k) =
k−1
∑
l=0
(κ2)k−lθi, j(l) (57)
where θi, j(k) is defined in (56), and κ2 > 0 is a discount factor.
Then, σi, j(k) ∈ (0,1] and
1) for a compromised neighboring sensor node j, σi, j(k)→
0.
2) for a intact neighboring sensor node j, σi, j(k) = 1.
Proof. The result follows the similar argument as given in the
proof of Lemma 2.
Note that the external belief of sensor node i in (57) can be
implemented using following difference equation
σi, j(k+1) = σi, j(k)+∆κ2(θi, j(k)−σi, j(k)) (58)
where ∆ denotes the sampling interval. Using the presented
idea of external belief, one can identify the attacks on commu-
nication channel and discard the contribution of compromised
information for the state estimation. In next subsection, for
notional consistency, we ignore time-indexing in beliefs while
incorporating them in the presented resilient event-triggered
DKF.
C. Mitigation using Internal belief and External belief
This subsection incorporates the internal and external beliefs
to design a resilient event-triggered DKF. To this end, using
the presented internal belief βi(k) in (54) and external belief
σi, j(k) in (57), we design the resilient form of the event-
triggered DKF as
xˆi = x¯i+Ki(βiyi+(1−βi)Cimi−Cix¯i)+ γi ∑
j∈Ni
σi, jβ j(x˜ j− x˜i)
(59)
where the weighted neighbor’s measurement mi is defined as
mi =
1
|Ni| ∑j∈Ni
σi, jβ j x˜ j = x+ εi (60)
where εi denotes the deviation between the weighted state
estimate mi and the process state x.
We call this a meta-Bayesian inference that integrates the
first-order inference (state estimates) with second-order esti-
mates or belief (external and internal beliefs on trustworthiness
of state estimate beliefs).
Assumption 4. The network connectivity is at least (2q+1),
i.e., at least half of the neighbors of each sensor are intact
[19], [38].
Theorem 8. Consider the resilient event triggered DKF (59)
with the triggering mechanism (3). Let the time-varying graph
be G (k) such that at each time instant k, Assumption 3 and
Assumption 4 are satisfied. Then, in the absence of noise,
the consensus filter error dynamics remains bounded with the
coupling coefficient γi given in (16), despite attacks. Moreover,
the bound depends on the deviation of weighted state estimate
mi in (60) from the target state.
Proof. Using the presented resilient estimator (59), one has
(x¯i)
+ = Axˆi = A(x¯i+Ki(βiyi+(1−βi)Cimi−Cix¯i)
+ γi ∑
j∈Ni
σi, jβ j(x˜ j− x˜i)) (61)
Substituting mi = x+ εi from (60) in (61), the error dynamics
without noise becomes
(η¯i)+ = AMiη¯i+Aγi ∑
j∈Ni
ai j(η˜ j− η˜i)−AKi(1−βi)Ciεi (62)
where ai j = σi, jβ j and Mi = I−KiCi.
Based on Assumption 4, the total number of the compro-
mised sensors is less than half of the network connectivity, i.e.,
2q+1. Therefore, even if q neighbors of an intact sensor node
are attacked and collude to send the same value to mislead it,
there still exists q+1 intact neighbors that communicate values
different from the compromised ones. Moreover, since at least
half of the intact sensor’s neighbors are intact, it can update its
beliefs to discard the compromised neighbor’s state estimates.
Furthermore, since the time varying graph G (k) resulting from
isolating the compromised sensors, based on Assumption 3
and Assumption 4, the entire network is still assumed to be
collectively observable. Using the external-belief and internal
belief of neighboring sensors, the incoming information from
the compromised communication channels is discarded.
Now using the resilient estimator error dynamics in (62), if
the sensor node i is confident about its own measurement, i.e.,
βi = 1 then (62) becomes
(η¯i)+ = AMiη¯i+Aγi ∑
j∈Ni
ai j(η˜ j− η˜i) (63)
The proof for the state estimation error boundedness can be
directly followed from Theorem 2 in [15]. On the other hand, if
the sensor node i is not confident about its own measurement,
i.e., βi ≈ 0 then (62) can be approximated as
(η¯i)+ = AMiη¯i+Aγi ∑
j∈Ni
ai j(η˜ j− η˜i)−AKiCiεi (64)
where εi represents the bounded error between the weighted
state estimate mi and the process state x. As the weighted
state estimate mi depends on intact neighboring sensors mea-
surement and hence it is close to actual target state which
makes εi small or close to zero. Now following the proof of
Theorem 2 in [15], one can conclude that the state estimation
error will always remain bounded and the bound depends on
the deviation εi. This completes the proof.
Based on the attack detection approach presented section
V, one can detect the attacker’s misbehavior and estimate
the target state using the presented resilient forms for both
continuous-triggering misbehavior and non-triggering misbe-
havior or under any other attacks. Note that the presented
resilient form in (59) prevents the non-triggering misbehav-
ior from happening and maintains the network connectivity
based on neighbor’s measurement. Similarly, for continuous-
triggering misbehavior, the presented resilient approach in (59)
discards the corrupted sensor information and avoid propaga-
tion of attacks in the network and, consequently maintains the
performance of the event-triggered DKF.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents simulation results for the presented
attack detection and mitigation approach. We consider a set
of 5 sensors in an undirected network shown in Fig.1, and
attempt to track the position of a target.
Fig. 2: Communication topology.
Consider the process dynamics in (1) for generating the
target trajectory as
xk+1 =
[
cos(pi/200) −sin(pi/200)
sin(pi/200) cos(pi/200)
]
xk + wk (65)
and the observation matrix Ci in (2) is assumed to be identity.
The noise covariance and initial state are set as
Q = I2 Ri = I2 x0 = (20,0) (66)
It is shown in Fig. 3 that in the absence of the attack,
sensors reach consensus on the state estimates, i.e., the state
estimates of sensors converge to the actual position of the
target. This result follows Theorem 1. Fig. 4 shows the event
generation based on the event-triggering mechanism in (3)
with the predefined threshold α = 0.8. The number of the
estimation updates for sensor 1 using the event-triggering
mechanism in (3) are found to be 51 for the simulated du-
ration of 20 seconds (i.e. 200 sampling instants). The average
frequency of estimation is approximately 25 Hz. Then, the
sensor 1 of the network is compromised with the attack signal
f1(k) = 10sin(50k) after 20 seconds. Fig. 5 illustrates the
effect of attack on sensor 1and it shows the compromised
sensors and other sensors in the network deviates from the
desired target state and results in non-zero estimation error
based on the attack signal. This follows the results presented
in Theorem 3. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows the event genera-
tion based on the event-triggering mechanism in (3) in the
presence of attack and one can observe that after injection of
attack on sensor 1, the event-triggered system becomes time-
triggered and shows continuous-triggering misbehavior. This
result complies with the analysis presented for the continuous-
triggering misbehavior.
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Fig. 3: State estimation errors in the absence of attack.
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Fig. 4: Transmit function for sensor 1 in the absence of attack.
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Fig. 5: State estimation errors under attack on sensor 1.
Now, Fig. 7 presents the result for the KL divergence
based attack detection mechanism. The divergence for the
compromised sensor, i.e., sensor 1 grows after attack injection
at k = 20 and for healthy sensors it remains close to zero
based on the attack detection mechanism presented in the
Theorem 5. The internal belief of the sensor is evaluated
based on the Lemma 2 with the discount factor κ1 = 0.5 and
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Fig. 6: Transmit function for sensor 1 under attack.
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Fig. 7: KL divergence in the presence of attack for attack detection.
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Fig. 8: Internal belief of sensors in the presence of attack.
Fig. 9: State estimation errors under attack on sensor 1 using proposed resilient state
estimator.
uncertainty threshold ϒ1 = 0.5. Fig. 8 shows the internal belief
of sensors in the presence of the considered attack which is
close to one for healthy sensors and tends to zero for the
compromised one. Then, the belief based proposed resilient
estimator is implemented and Fig. 9 shows the result for
the state estimation using the resilient estimator (59). After
the injection of attack, within few seconds, the sensors reach
consensus on the state estimates, i.e., the state estimates of
sensors converge to the actual position of the target. The result
in Fig. 9 follows the Theorem 8.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we analyzed the adverse effects of cyber-
physical attacks on the event-triggered DKF. We show that
attacker can adversely affect the performance of the DKF.
We also show that the event-triggered mechanism in the DKF
can be leveraged by the attacker to result in a non-triggering
misbehavior that significantly harms the network connectivity
and its collective observability. Then, an information-theoretic
approach is presented to detect attacks on both sensors and
communication channels. Finally, to mitigate attacks, a meta-
Bayesian approach is presented that incorporates the outcome
of the attack detection mechanism to perform second-order
inference and consequently form beliefs over beliefs, i.e., inter-
nal and external beliefs of a sensor. Each sensor communicates
its internal belief to its neighbors. Sensors then incorporate
the internal beliefs of their neighbors and their own external
beliefs about their neighbors into their posterior update laws to
successfully discard corrupted sensor information. Then, the
simulation result illustrates the performance of the presented
resilient event-triggered DKF.
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